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Abstract
Mobile agent security is still a young discipline and most naturally, the focus up to the time
of writing was on inventing new cryptographic protocols for securing various aspects of
mobile agents. However, past experience shows that protocols can be flawed, and flaws
in protocols can remain unnoticed for a long period of time. The game of breaking and
fixing protocols is a necessary evolutionary process that leads to a better understanding of
the underlying problems and ultimately to more robust and secure systems. Although, to
the best of our knowledge, little work has been published on breaking protocols for mobile
agents, it is inconceivable that the multitude of protocols proposed so far are all flawless.
As it turns out, the opposite is true. We identify flaws in protocols proposed by Corradi
et al., Karjoth et al., and Karnik et al., including protocols based on secure coprocessors.
Additionally, we propose how the protocols can be strengthened against the types of attacks
we launch against them.
Key words: mobile agent security, breaking security protocols.
1 Introduction
This paper was inspired by a previous work by Ross Anderson and Roger Need-
ham, titled “Programming Satan’s Computer” [1], which was published in 1995.
A version of its abstract serves us as introduction. We took the liberty to alter the
original text slightly, so that it better fits the context of mobile agent security.
“Cryptographic protocols are used in systems for mobile agents to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of data acquired by agents [are used in distributed sys-
tems to identify users and authenticate transactions]. They may involve about 2-5
protocol steps per hop [the exchange of 2-5 messages], and one might think that a
program of this size would be fairly easy to get right. However, this is absolutely
not the case; bugs can be found [bugs are routinely found] in known protocols, and
years after they were first published. The problem is the presence of a hostile op-
ponent, who can create agents and alter an agents’ contents at will [alter messages
at will]. In effect, our task is to program mobile agents which give answers [a com-
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puter which gives answers] which are subtly and maliciously wrong at the most
inconvenient possible moment. This is a fascinating problem; and we hope that
the lessons learned from programming Satan’s agents [computer] may be helpful
in tackling the more common problem of programming Murphy’s.”
Analyzing cryptographic protocols for mobile agent protection means meet-
ing old friends and foes. Some of these protocols are flawed in ways similar to
those already pointed out by Anderson and Needham in the context of program-
ming Satan’s computer. We first summarize the typical objectives of the protocols
we analyze:
Objective 1 (Confidentiality) Mobile agents shall reveal cleartext only while be-
ing on trusted hosts.
Objective 2 (Integrity) The agents shall be protected such that they can acquire
new data on each host they visit, but any tampering with pre-existing data must be
detected by the agent’s owner (and possibly by other hosts on the agent’s itinerary).
The general objective here is to protect certain features of a mobile agent against
malicious hosts. By assumption, the host of the agent’s owner is always trusted.
Some of the protocols address both objectives simultaneously, others address just
one. All protocols are targeted at protecting free-roaming mobile agents. In other
words, mobile agents that are free to choose their respective next hop dynamically
based on data they acquired in the course of their execution.
Our attacks follow two general patterns; variations and combinations of them
are executed repeatedly:
cut & paste: The attacking host cuts a portion out of one agent, and pastes it into
another agent. In effect, data taken from one protocol run is used in another.
oracle exploit: The attacking host generates an agent of its own and dispatches it
to one or more remote hosts on which the agent is transformed as required by the
cryptographic protocol.
The combination of both patterns enables attacks on cryptographic protocols de-
vised in [7,3,5,6]. In some cases this leads to a complete compromise of the pro-
tocol’s security objectives. In other cases the adversary is able to forge and replace
subsets of the protocol data in a way that makes it impossible for an agent’s owner
to detect the tampering. The important observation here is not that protocol data
acquired by agents can be truncated (some authors already acknowledge this possi-
bility) but that the attacker can exercise control over the data returned by an agent.
2 Some Protocol Failures
We will write encryption of some plaintext into a ciphertext symbolically as c =
{m}K , where K is the key being used. A digital signature will be written as an
encryption with a private signing key S−1. We will write S−1(m) when we refer
to the bare signature rather than the union of the signature and the signed data.
We assume that the identity of the signer can be extracted from her signature. A
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cryptographic hash of some input will be written h(m). Unless noted otherwise,
we assume that h is preimage resistant and collision resistant [8, §9.2.2], which
implies that h must also be 2nd-preimage resistant [8, §9.2.5]. When A sends some
message m to B we will write A → B : m. We will write A → B : {m}KA,B
when m is sent over a confidential channel. Concatenation of m1 and m2 is written
as m1 || m2. For ease of reading, we refer to some entities by their nicknames,
e.g. Alice, Bob, and Eve. In general, Eve will play the role of the adversary, Alice
will play the role of the victim agent’s owner, Bob and Dave will play the role of
additional entities taking part in the protocols. The itinerary of Alice’s agent is
written as i0, . . . , in, where i0 = Alice and in is the host currently visited by the
agent.
2.1 Decrypting the targeted state
In [7], Karnik and Tripathi propose a targeted state as a means to protect the con-
fidentiality of data carried by an agent. The idea is to make this data available to
the agent only when it is on a host that is trusted with respect to keeping this data
confidential from other agents and hosts. In order to achieve this, the plaintext is
encrypted with the public key of the trusted host. The targeted state looks like this:
{{m1}Ki1 , . . . , {mn}Kin}S−1A
The targeted state is signed by Alice, who is the originator of the agent owning the
targeted state. Having received an agent, each host inspects the targeted state for
ciphertexts it can decrypt. If so, the host decrypts it using its own private decryption
key, and makes the cleartext available to the agent.
Below, we illustrate the attack on this protocol. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the agent’s targeted state contains a single ciphertext, which is
encrypted with the public key of Bob. Alice first sends the agent to Eve from
whom it hops to Bob and then returns to Alice. The protocol starts as follows (for
simplicity, we assume here that an agent initially consists only of its targeted state
and its program ΠA):
A→ E : ΠA, {{m}KB}S−1A
The attack is straightforward. Eve strips off Alice’s signature, copies {m}KB into
the targeted state of an agent of her own, signs this targeted state, and sends her
agent to Bob:
E → B : ΠE, {{m}KB}S−1E
B : ΠE, {{m}KB}S−1E , {{m}KB}K−1B = m
Bob innocently decrypts the targeted state using his own private key and makes
the resulting plaintext available to the agent. The agent then migrates back to Eve
carrying the plaintext.
B → E : ΠE, {{m}KB}S−1E , m
Eve now is in possession of the plaintext which should be available only to Bob;
Alice never detects the attack. The problem with this protocol is that, due to a lack
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of redundancy in the ciphertext, Bob can be abused as an oracle. Alice needs to
include an unforgeable identifier of her agent in the ciphertext, e.g. h(ΠA, A). Even
then, the agent’s program must be unique for each agent 1 and designed carefully
such that it can not be abused in the way illustrated above by means of malicious
state changes.
2.2 Forging the append only container
In addition to the targeted state, Karnik and Tripathi also propose an append only
container. The idea is to protect a container of objects in an agent such that new
objects can be added to it but any subsequent modification of an object contained
therein can be detected by the agent’s owner. The protocol relies on an encrypted
checksum, whose initial value is computed by Alice (the agent’s owner) based on a
random nonce r as follows:
C0= {r}KA
The nonce must be kept secret by Alice, and is used in the verification protocol
upon the agent’s return. The append only container is defined as follows:
{{m1}S−1i1 , . . . , {mn}S−1in , Cn}
Whenever a new object is appended to the append only container, the checksum is
updated 2 as given below:
Cn+1= {Cn || S−1in+1(mn+1)}KA
The signer of the appended object is the host on which the append operation takes
place. Upon the agent’s return, Alice successively decrypts the checksums, extracts
the signature, and verifies the signature against the corresponding object in the
container. The last checksum must equal the initial nonce.
We now assume that Eve received Alice’s agent and she knows Cj for some
1 ≤ j ≤ n. Eve always knows Cn, because it is embedded in the container. She
might collude with other servers which the agent visited before, or she might be part
of a loop in the agent’s itinerary. In these cases, Eve might discover a checksum Cj
with j < n.
At this stage, Eve has multiple choices. She can either truncate the container up
to the j’th object and grow a fake stem by releasing the agent. Or she can remove,
add or replace arbitrary objects ml with l > j in the name of other hosts. In order
to do this, Eve creates an agent with the object that she wants to add at j+1, and an
append only container of her own, with checksum Cj as its initial value. Eve now
sends her agent to Bob. There, Eve’s agent inserts mj+1 in its own targeted state
and migrates back:
1 Otherwise Eve can still cut & paste targeted states back and forth between agents that are owned
by Alice and which share the same program.
2 In the original protocol description, the signature and identity of the server are appended. On the
other hand, we assume that the signer’s identity can be extracted from the signature and appending
it is, therefore, redundant.
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E → B : ΠE, mj+1, {Cj}
B → E : ΠE, {{mj+1}S−1B , {Cj || S
−1
B (mj+1)}KE}
Upon the agent’s return, Eve decrypts the checksum using her own private key, and
re-encrypts it using the public key of Alice:
Cj+1= {{{Cj || S−1B (mj+1)}KE}K−1E }KA
= {Cj || S−1B (mj+1)}KA
Then, she constructs a new container:
{ {m1}S−1i1 , . . . , {mj}S−1ij
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from A’s agent
,
from E’s agent
︷ ︸︸ ︷
{mj+1}S−1B , Cj+1 }
which replaces the previous container of Alice’s agent. This process is repeated
with the new checksum until Eve is pleased with the result, and releases Alice’s
agent. Bob is not able to detect the attack, because Cj is not publicly verifiable
(it is encrypted with Alice’s public key). All Bob can see is the length of Cj ,
from which he can estimate the number of objects that must be in the append only
container. So if Eve wants to make sure that Bob has no reason to get suspicious
then she adds j signed objects to her agent’s container before she sends it to Bob.
As long as these objects are properly signed it does not matter who signed them
and where she got them.
Once again, a lack of redundancy allows Eve to abuse other hosts as oracles, this
time for the purpose of signing and checksum computation rather than decryption.
2.3 Forging the multi-hops protocol
In [3], Corradi, Montanari, and Stefanelli propose a protocol they call multi-hops,
which has the same purpose as the append only container presented by Karnik and
Tripathi. It falls prey to the same type of attack. However, this time, the faked agent
needs to do one more hop to complete its attack. For reference, we summarize the
multi-hops protocol below.
Let (Π,M,P) be an agent where Π is static (immutable) code and initialization
data, M is (mutable) application data, and P is protocol data (meta information
required by the protocol). Alice initializes her agent with (ΠA, , ). The protocol
additionally requires a nonce γ and a message authentication code µ. The initial
values are γ0 = h(r) and µ0 = , where r is chosen randomly. On each hop, the
agent can add some data M to its application data, which is then protected by the
host using the multi-hops protocol. The protocol is defined as given below:
γn=h(γn−1)
µn=h(mn, γn−1, µn−1, in+1)
Pn=Pn−1 || S−1in (µn)
Mn=Mn−1 || mn || in
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in → in+1 : (ΠA,Mn,Pn), {γn}Kin+1 , µn
The message authentication code γn serves as a chaining relation that binds results
previously obtained by the agent to the ones obtained at the current host and to the
identity of the agent’s next hop.
Due to this chaining relation, the attack cannot be executed in the same way as
it is done for the append only container. The resulting star shaped itinerary with
Eve in the center would be too obvious in the protocol data. What Eve has to do
here is to plan ahead one step.
Again, we assume that Eve knows some γj−1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. She received
the agent so she always knows γn−1 and µn−1. She can obtain γj−1 with j < n by
colluding with other hosts or as a result of loops in the agent’s itinerary. Let ij+1
be Bob, and ij+2 be Dave. Eve now sets Mj = Mj−1, Pj = Pj−1, γj = γj−1,
µj = µj−1, and does the following:
E → B : (ΠE,Mj,Pj), {γj}KB , µj
B → D : (ΠE, Mj || mj+1 || B, Pj || S−1B (µj+1)),
{γj+1}KD , µj+1
D → E : (ΠE, Mj || mj+1 || B ||M∗ || D,
Pj || S−1B (µj+1) || S−1D (µj+2)),
{γj+2}KE , µj+2
Eve sends her agent first to Bob where it inserts some mj+1 chosen by her. Then
it hops to Dave (who is the next target), inserts some random data M∗ (which is
discarded later on), and returns to Eve. Eve now updates Alice’s agent as shown
below, using the data acquired by her own agent:
(ΠA, Mj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
||
E
︷ ︸︸ ︷
mj+1 || B, Pj
︸︷︷︸
A
||
E
︷ ︸︸ ︷
S−1B (µj+1))
= (ΠA,Mj+1,Pj+1)
Eve now plans her next move (whom she wants to attack after Dave). In order to
send the agent to Dave she needs to know γj+1 and µj+1, but she doesn’t – yet.
However, Eve knows γj , µj , and mj+1. This is sufficient to compute
γj+1=h(γj)
µj+1=h(mj+1, γj, µj, D)
At this stage, Eve either continues the attack, or it releases Alice’s agent and sends
it to Dave, where it resumes normal execution.
E → D : (ΠA,Mj+1,Pj+1), {γj+1}KD , µj+1
The underlying weakness of the multi hops protocol is the same as in the previously
described protocols, namely, the abuse of servers as oracles.
129
Roth
3 The KAG family of protocols
Karjoth, Asokan, and Gu¨lcu¨ [5] published a family of protocols which are directed
at preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data acquired by free-roaming
agents. The general scenario is that of a comparison shopping agent that visits
a number of shops, and collects offers from them.
3.1 Publicly verifiable chained digital signatures
The Publicly verifiable chained digital signature protocol (P1) is defined as given
below:
Mn= {{mn, rn}KA , Cn}S−1in
Cn=h(Mn−1, in+1)
M0= {{m0, r0}KA , C0}S−1A
C0=h(r0, i1)
in → in+1 : Π, {M0, . . . , Mn}
where m0 is a dummy offer, rn is random salt that makes it harder to attack the
encryption. Cn is called the chaining relation at n. By assumption, it shall be
possible to deduce the identity of the signer from a signature [5, pp. 198]. The
signer of M0 is deemed to be the owner of the agent (unfortunately, the authors
of [5] do not explicitly mention from what they conclude who the owner of a given
agent is, so we have to do a little guesswork here).
The security of the protocol relies on the assumption that an attacker does not
change the last element Mn in the chain. However, there is no reason why an
attacker would be so obliging. On the contrary, if the attacker is willing to build
a complete chain for the agent then he can even remove chain elements before his
own entry (this contrasts with e.g. the honest prefix property introduced by Yee [11,
pp. 267]). The important observation here is that the input to all previous chaining
relations is known.
We assume that Eve received an agent owned by Alice. Let Eve be in, n > 1.
She picks j with 0 < j < n and a new ij+1 of her choice. Please note that there is
no free choice of ij once j is fixed, only of ij+1. Eve has to collect an offer from the
original shop ij for her chosen j in order to maintain the chaining relation’s validity
at j − 1. Then Eve does the following:
E → ij : ΠE, {M0, . . . , Mj−1}
ij → ij+1 : ΠE, {M0, . . . , Mj}
ij+1 → E : ΠE, {M0, . . . , Mj+1}
Upon the agent’s return, Eve throws away Mj+1, increments j, and picks a new
ij+1. The chaining relation and encapsulated offers are build as if Alice’s agent
had requested the offer (instead of Eve’s agent with Eve’s program) because M0
bears Alice’s signature. Eve repeats the process at her discretion. When she is
finally satisfied with the collection of encapsulated offers she assembled, she pastes
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them into Alice’s agent, and sends that agent to ij+1. If Alice can be fooled into
forwarding agents whose M0 she signed herself then Eve’s charade can carry on
until the very last (faked) hop. Otherwise, Eve has to stop her attack before the next
to last hop.
It must be stressed here that the problem is not that Eve can truncate offers and
grow a fake stem (this possibility is acknowledged by the authors, so this fact is
not surprising). The problem is that shops can be abused as oracles for generating
offers to the terms of Eve rather than Alice (this remark also holds for sections 3.2
and 3.3). In other words, Alice might look for blue or red shirts with a preference
on blue ones; she might find out that Eve is the only shop that offers her blue shirts,
though. This is possible because Eve’s agent looks only for red shirts, and the offers
made to this agent are returned to Alice.
3.2 Chained digital signatures with forward privacy
The second protocol proposed in [5] is the chained digital signature protocol with
forward privacy. It is a variation of the protocol discussed in section 3.1, with the
order of encryption and signature computation being swapped. The goal of this
arrangement is to hide the identity of shops that provided offers while keeping the
integrity assurances. The protocol is defined as given below:
Mn= {{mn}S−1in , rn}KA , Cn
Cn=h(Mn−1, rn, in+1)
in → in+1 : Π, {M0, . . . , Mn}
A problem we couldn’t resolve is how a shop knows who the owner of an agent
is, and hence for whom the offers must be encrypted. The shop cannot extract the
identity of Alice from M0, because the signature of the dummy offer m0 is hidden
by the encipherment. The authors leave that to speculation. The protocol’s descrip-
tion is far from being sufficiently detailed at this point. Whereas a signer’s identity
can be verified easily against her signature using a public key and corresponding
certificate (where the identity binding is assured by a certification authority), any-
body could have used somebody else’s public key to encrypt data.
Again, we assume that Eve received Alice’s agent, and Eve is in as in the pre-
vious attacks. Let j be the smallest number for which Eve knows ij . Eve probably
knows in−1 because this is most certainly the host that sent her the agent. In any
case she knows in (her own identity).
Eve collects arbitrary signed offers using agents of her own, including an offer
from ij . Then, she cuts off the chain at j, and appends the offers, starting with the
fresh one collected from ij and the remaining ones in arbitrary order. In doing so,
she generates random nonces as required, and builds the chaining relations consec-
utively from known data. The last chaining relation is computed with the identity
of the entity to whom Eve wants to hand off Alice’s agent.
Upon the agent’s return, Alice cannot decide whether her agent remained
unattacked, or carries offers of shops it has never seen actually. It is worth noting
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that the integrity assurance of the protocol relies on the secrecy of the association of
Mj with the identity of the shop who signed offer mj . This means that privacy of
offers is not only a feature of the protocol, but is also a requirement. In particular,
secrecy of the agent’s itinerary is a requirement.
Once again, not the truncation of protocol data is the important point, but Eve’s
ability to set the terms for (authentic) offers returned to Alice.
3.3 Publicly verifiable chained signatures
The remaining protocol proposed in [5] is the publicly verifiable chained signatures
protocol. The key aspect of the protocol is that each shop generates a temporary
asymmetric key pair (either on the fly or by means of pre-computation) to be used
by the successor. The public key is certified by the shop that generated the key pair.
Each shop uses the private key that it received from its predecessor for signing its
partial result, the chaining relation, and the public key to be used by its successor.
The private key is destroyed subsequently. Let (χA, χ−1A ) be a temporary key pair
generated by A. The protocol is as follows:
Mn= {{mn, rn}KA , Cn,
oracle
︷︸︸︷
χin }χ−1in−1
Cn=h(Mn−1, in+1)
in → in+1 : Π, {M0, . . . , Mn}, {χ−1in }Kin,in+1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
oracle
The protocol is initialized by Alice with:
M0= {{m0, r0}KA , C0, χA}S−1A
C0=h(r0, i1)
It is easy to see that Eve can collect valid certified temporary key pairs from Bob,
simply by dispatching and agent of her own to Bob, which promptly returns to
Eve. On the agent’s transport to Eve, Bob sends a temporary private key χ−1B and
corresponding certified public key χB (contained in M).
We assume that Eve is in and she received Alice’s agent. Let j be the smallest
number for which Eve knows χ−1ij . She received χ
−1
in−1 with the agent, so at least one
such j exists and j < n. Eve then cuts off all encapsulated offers following Mj ,
and collects key pairs from all the shops in whose names she wants to fake offers,
including shop ij+1. Starting with ij+1, she appends arbitrary offers, building the
protocol data consecutively. The identity that Eve uses in the final chaining relation
is the one of the entity to whom she wants to hand off Alice’s agent (for instance
Alice herself).
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4 Protocols using secure coprocessors
In [6], Karjoth proposes use of trusted secure coprocessors as a means to protect
mobile agents in a distributed marketplace. The setting equals that described in
section 3, with the exception that each shop in has a trusted tamperproof hardware
Tn (in brief, its device), which is issued and certified by a central market author-
ity . The market authority acts as a trusted third party for merchands and cus-
tomers. By assumption, the channel between a shop and its device is secure against
active attacks. Each device has its own asymmetric key pair, and is capable of
computing suitable asymmetric ciphers, symmetric ciphers, and message digests.
Furthermore, each device has the public key of the market authority, and uses it to
authenticate the public keys of other devices.
At the beginning of the protocol, Alice chooses a random K and sets C1 =
h(K). The protocol continues as follows:
in−1 → in : ΠA, {K, Cn}KTn , {M1, . . . , Mn−1},
{C1, . . . , Cn−1}
in → Tn : {K, Cn}KTn , {mn}S−1in , {KTn+1}S−1
Tn :Mn = {{mn}S−1in }K, Cn+1 = h(Mn, Cn)
Tn → in : {K, Cn+1}KTn+1 , {Cn+1}K, Cn,Mn
in → in+1 : ΠA, {K, Cn+1}KTn+1 , {M1, . . . , Mn},
{C1, . . . , Cn}
In the final protocol step, the last shop sends Alice the agent and the final checksum,
which is encrypted with K:
in → i0 : ΠA, {M1, . . . , Mn}, {C1, . . . , Cn}, {Cn+1}K
Alice knows K, so she decrypts {Cn+1}K, verifies the checksums consecutively
from C1 to Cn+1, decrypts M1, . . . , Mn, and finally she verifies the signatures.
We assume that Eve runs a shop in the electronic marketplace, which implies
that she has a device certified by the market authority. Consider that Eve received
an agent owned by Alice, so Eve is in. Eve now has a number of encrypted offers,
an equal number of checksums, and {K, Cn}KTn , which can be decrypted only by
her device.
From the protocol, we know that Cn+1 = h(Mn, Cn). There is nothing secret
about h, so in fact Eve can take j of the n − 1 encrypted offers, shuffle them, and
re-compute the appropriate checksums herself, beginning with the initial checksum
C1 (without ever going through her device). However, Alice expects to receive a
matching {Cj+1}K with her agent. Eve cannot encrypt her final checksum with K
because she does not know it – but her device can do it for her! All Eve has to do
is passing Cj+1 in the place where her device expects to receive Eve’s signed offer:
E → Tn : {K, Cn}KTn , Cj+1
︸︷︷︸
substituted for Eve’s offer
, {KTn}S−1
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The device first extracts Alice’s secret key K from {K, Cn}KTn , which is encrypted
with the device’s public key. Then the device uses K to encrypt what it thinks is
Eve’s signed offer. Only that it is not the signed offer but the checksum that must
be passed back to Alice with her agent.
Tn :Mn = {Cj+1}K
︸ ︷︷ ︸
oracle computation
, C ′ = h({Cj+1}K, Cj+1)
Eve also passed her own device’s public key rather than that of another shop’s
device. What Eve gets back from her device is:
Tn → E : {K, Cn+1}KTn , {C ′}K, Cn, {Cj+1}K
︸ ︷︷ ︸
leaked result
In other words, given a set of signed offersM1, . . . , Mj (which are encrypted with
Alice’s secret keyK), Eve can construct a valid representation of Alice’s agent, and
return it to Alice in a way that is indistinguishable from an ordinary run of the agent.
Eve can also collect signed offers herself (at her own terms) using agents of her
own. For instance, let {mB}S−1B be such an offer, collected from Bob. Eve sends
this offer to her device, rather than one of her own offers:
E → Tn : {K, Cn}KTn , {mB}S−1B
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bob’s offer
, {KTn}S−1
Tn → in : {K, Cn+1}KTn , {Cn+1}K, Cn,MB︸︷︷︸
Bob’s offer encrypted with K
The device returns the offer encrypted withK. Offers prepared in this way can also
be used by Eve in her attack on the checksum.
If Eve just wants to append offers that she collected to Alice’s agent (following
Mn−1), then the attack is even simpler. All Eve has to do is passing her own
device’s public key to her device rather than that of another shop’s device until she
wants to hand off Alice’s agent. In that case she either passes the public key of the
next shop’s device, or returns the agent to Alice herself.
In summary, Eve can delete and rearrange any offers brought by the agent,
and insert forged offers collected by her, at any position 3 in the chain of results.
This means in particular that the protocol does not achieve forward integrity as is
claimed by its author. The surprising fact is that although secure coprocessors are
used, the protocol fails where some software only approaches succeed (for instance
the chained MAC protocol [5]). The lesson that is to be learned is that tamperproof
hardware is no guarantee for improved security.
3 In general, Eve knows only {K, Cn}KTn , so if she touches any encrypted offers before n then
she has to hand off the agent herself to Alice, and cannot let another shop do this. However, she can
pass on the agent if she knows that it will return to her before it hops back to Alice.
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5 How can we be saved?
We described the crypto protocols design problem for mobile agent security as
“programming Satan’s agents” because a mobile agent under the control of an ad-
versary is possibly the most obstructive piece of code which one could send. It may
give answers which are subtly and maliciously wrong at the most inconvenient pos-
sible moment. In order to be saved, we must check first that a protocol does not
commit the old familiar sins, because the Devil did not have to come up with a new
and pernicious twist in the attacks we described. In 1995, Anderson and Needham
gave some rules of thumb of good and bad practice; we quote three of them below:
• “be clear about the purpose of encryption — secrecy, authenticity, binding, or
producing pseudorandom numbers. Do not assume that its use is synonymous
with security;”
• “where the identity of a principal is essential to the meaning of a message, it
should be mentioned explicitly in that message.”
• “be careful, especially when signing or decrypting data, not to let yourself be
used as an oracle by the opponent;”
We might continue and quote entire sections. Their plea remains valid as ever.
Instead, we concentrate on particularities of mobile agents. A mobile agent is com-
parable to an active “token” that is passed around by the entities who participate in
a protocol. An important entity – the agent’s owner – participates in general only
at the beginning and end of a lengthy protocol run (which is part of the demand
for autonomy of agents). Agents can be underway for some while, therefore it is
difficult to have a notion of “freshness”. Any timeout must probably be so long
that an attack can likely be carried out within the validity period of the protocol
data. Furthermore, the identity assumption does not hold for mobile agents, which
is a cornerstone of many “traditional” security protocols. Chess [2] describes the
identity assumption as follows:
“Whenever a program attempts some action, we can easily identify a person to
whom that action can be attributed, and it is safe to assume that that person
intends the action to be taken.”
This assumption fails when applied to mobile agents, because “a migrating
agent can become malicious by virtue of its state getting corrupted” [4]. We cannot
assume that an agent properly represents the intentions of its owner, because – sub-
sequent to its first hop – an agent’s state is a function of its own program and state,
and the state and program of the hosts that it visited.
Let us assume, for a moment, that the identity assumption held for mobile
agents. When Alice sends an agent, can we use Alice’s identity then, and fol-
low the second rule? Certainly not, because Eve can still cut & paste protocol data
among two different agent instances owned by Alice. Different agents represent
different protocol runs, and – again – Anderson and Needham already noted that
we must “be sure to distinguish different protocol runs from each other.” This leads
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to the important conclusion that
digitally signing a mobile agent’s code alone is not sufficient to assert agent
ownership.
However, this approach is a favorable one among contemporary mobile agent
systems. A signature on code can be copied just like the code itself. Code is
written to be re-used, so the agent instance is what renders an agent (a protocol run)
distinct. Seen in this light, it is even less desirable to sign credentials that contain
a code base rather than the code itself (as described e.g. in [7]), because this gives
Eve potentially more agent programs to choose from. Each agent program that is
available from a particlar code base can be used in conjunction with credentials that
refer to the code base.
Preferably, Alice signs a static kernel of her agent (which must of course include
the code required by this particular agent). The kernel must be unique for each of
her agents. Protocol data must be bound to this kernel and Alice’s identity. This
does not relieve us from the burden to write agent programs which cannot easily be
abused by means of malicious state changes, but serves as an anchor for protocol
data, and makes it harder to abuse legitimate hosts as oracles. We give a sketch of
how this might work in section 6.
6 Repairing protocols
One problem repeatedly occurred in the protocols we analyzed: a legitimate host
could be abused as an oracle that decrypts, signs, or otherwise computes protocol
data on behalf of an adversary. Mobile agent systems are particularly vulnerable by
this type of attack because they are meant to work autonomously, and no human in-
tervention is expected to happen in order to validate and authorize the execution of
cryptographic services provided to agents. Hence, agent servers and agent owners
must have means to decide whether protocol data that an agent requests to process
or returns, actually belongs to that agent. Below, we sketch two approaches suitable
to solve this problem.
The first approach binds confidential data to a particular agent instance so that
this binding can be verified by the decryptor before decryption takes place. It is a
slightly simplified version of a protocol we describe in [10].
The second approach demonstrates how data, that is acquired by mobile agents
dynamically, can be authenticated and bound to a particular agent instance so that
Alice can immediately spot attempts to fake or reuse protocol data.
6.1 Binding confidential data
The idea is to construct an agent kernel and ciphertexts in a way that allows au-
thorized hosts to detect whether a ciphertext brought by an agent actually belongs
to the agent. For simplicity, we assume that there shall be only one ciphertext and
one authorized host. Let Bob be an authorized host. Alice prepares her agent as
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follows:
Φr0 = {{ΠA, r0, h(SA, K0)}S−1A
︸ ︷︷ ︸
The agent’s kernel
, {m0}K0 , B, {K0}KB}
where r0 is a random number and K0 is a randomly generated secret key, both long
enough to make any chance of being used twice (in the case of r0) or found by ex-
haustion attacks in due time (in the case of K0) negligible, and SA is Alice’s public
signing key (more precisely, her signing key’s public key certificate). We assume
that Alice’s identity can be derived from her signature. Signature verification shall
imply verification of the identity to public key binding, e.g. by means of public
key certificates using a trusted public key infrastructure. Alice dispatches her agent
which eventually migrates to Bob: A ∗→ B : Φr0
Bob verifies Alice’s signature on the agent’s kernel. If the verification succeeds
then Bob recovers K0 from {K0}KB using his private decryption key. Next, he
computes h(SA, K0) and verifies the result with its counterpart in the agent’s kernel.
If both match then Bob decrypts {m0}K0 , and makes m0 available to the agent.
The value of h(SA, K0) serves as a proof that the alleged owner of {m0}K0
actually knows the secret decryption key K0. The proof can be verified only by
entities who can recover K0, and it cannot be modified without breaking the digital
signature of the agent that owns the encrypted data.
The effect is that Eve, having received Φr0 , cannot use an agent of her own to
plant an egg and have it hatched by Bob. Neither can she plant her egg in another
instance of Alice’s agent, because each kernel is unique. Eve has to tamper with
Φr0 in a way such that it goes to Bob, takes m0, stores the plaintext in a place
where Eve can get to it later on, and returns to her. As a consequence, ΠA must be
designed carefully to cope with this threat.
6.2 Binding acquired data
In this section we construct an agent kernel Φ, and we derive an unique implicit
name φ from it, in brief implicit name:
ΦzA = {ΠA, zA}S−1A
︸ ︷︷ ︸
the agent’s kernel
φzA = h(S
−1
A (ΠA, zA))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
the implicit name
where zA is a random number large enough to make any chance of being used
twice by Alice negligible. Whenever an agent with kernel ΦzA requests Bob to
sign some protocol data m, Bob actually computes {m,φzA}S−1B . In other words,
m is valid only in the context of the agent instance whose implicit name is signed
along with m. This binding can be verified by Alice upon her agent’s return. As a
consequence, protocol data that was not requested by Alice’s agent is rejected.
Please note that zA is required and must not be re-used with the same agent
program ΠA. For practical purposes, the current time should suffice (we anticipate
that attacks on Alice’s clock are infeasible).
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7 Conclusions
The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist.
— from motion picture “The Usual Suspects”
Judging from the number of respective publications we could find by means of the
World Wide Web, research in basic cryptographic protocols for protecting mobile
agents seems to have petered out after 1998 when compared to the flurry of the two
years before. One reason might be that there were protocols around that seemed to
solve a fair amount of what is considered achievable in software-only approaches.
In this paper, we would like to reinvigorate this area of research.
We analyzed seven protocols which have the objective to protect secrecy and
integrity of data carried or acquired by mobile agents from malicious hosts. In all
cases, the protocols turned out to be vulnerable to a combination of cut & paste
attacks and oracle exploits. These vulnerabilities stem from the fact that certain
design rules set forth already years ago were not followed faithfully.
Additionally we proposed improvements to the analyzed protocols in order to
render them more robust against the types of attacks we launched against them. In
particlar, we described how mobile agent kernels must be designed that uniquely
identify a particular instance of a mobile agent, and showed how such kernels can
be used e.g. to prevent abuse of legitimate hosts as oracles for decrypting and sign-
ing data brought and acquired by mobile agents.
Despite the improvements we proposed, software-only protection against gen-
eral truncation attacks is still out of reach. Assume that Eve knows Alice’s agent
in state σj . Later, Eve receives the same agent in state σn with n > j. Eve may
always reset the agent to state σj unless there is either a notion of freshness (tricky,
we discussed this briefly in section 5) or an external state not under the control of
Eve (which is at the bottomline of what we proposed in [9]).
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